How Free is Freedom of Thought
By Sanath Nanayakkara
There is at present a view, widely prevalent especially among the educated Buddhists,
that Buddhism is a rationalist teaching based on scientifically verifiable evidence.
Much has been written to substantiate this view-point and, undoubtedly, such
writings have immensely contributed to the further strengthening and spreading
of this view. Most of the proponents of this view cite the Kalama Sutta of the
Anguttaranikaya as providing unassailable evidence to prove that Buddhism is
a rationalistic teaching with an absolutely scientific basis, and that the Buddha
advocated a rationalistic
approach as the sole method of understanding all his teachings. It is no exaggeration
to say that it is Western scholarship that highlighted the importance of the
Kalama Sutta as some kind of 'Charter of Free Inquiry. ' This 'new finding'
was enthusiastically taken up and strongly supported by the predominantly Western-trained
Buddhist scholarship of the time to bring to light that the Buddha denounced
adherence to blind faith and dogmatism and instead encouraged free inquiry and
investigation. In further support of such a position, these writers cited the
Buddha's rejection of the belief in a divine creator, his acceptance of free
will, his anthropocentric approach to the human predicament, his acceptance
of the superiority of man, his invitation to the followers to inquire about
the Dhamma as well as his own claim to enlightenment and so on.
While the serious Buddhist scholarship was engaged in evaluating the Kalama
Sutta in order to find out the Buddha's attitude to freedom of thought and inquiry
and to ascertain the parameters within which this freedom could be put into
practice, the over-enthusiastic Buddhists lost in the euphoria of this 'new
finding', made indiscriminate use of the Kalama Sutta in their devoted attempt
to hail Buddhism as an out and out rationalist teaching, based purely on scientific
facts. In this attempt they found strong support from staunch rationalists,
who also freely cited the Kalama Sutta to show that even the Buddha advocated
free inquiry as the only valid means of obtaining knowledge.
Those who strongly held the view that Buddhism is entirely a form of rationalism
were so convinced of the validity of their position that they unhesitatingly
and hurriedly arrived at two significant conclusions. First, they concluded
that Buddhism is absolutely rationalist in its approach and that this is evident
from the Kalama Sutta, which advocates the complete rejection of the then generally
accepted ten means of knowledge, which also served as criteria to establish
the truth and wholesomeness of teachings and views. Second, they concluded that
the Kalama Sutta advocates the use of free, independent thinking as the only
valid means of deciding what is right and wrong with regard to all matters,
religious as well as otherwise. As these conclusions have much bearing on both
the theory and practice of Buddhism, they should be examined and evaluated carefully.
An unbiased and a careful reading of the Sutta makes it clear that there is
no evidence in it, either implicit or explicit, to show that the Buddha advocated
the 'rejection' of the ten means (criteria) of knowledge (truth). On the contrary,
Sutta contains evidence, corroborated by canonical references, to accept the
fact that the Buddha himself made appropriate use of many of these means as
aids to get at the truth and to distinguish between right and wrong. The following
are the ten means of criteria and their
general meanings.
1. Anussava = Vedic textual tradition
2. Parampar = Unbroken tradition maintained by a successive generation of teachers.
3. Itikir = Hearsay
4. Pitakasamp = Any approved textual tradition
5. Takkahetu = Logic
6. Nayahetu = Reasoning
7. _ k = Validity of the reasons contained in the teaching
8. Dighinijjh Anakkhati= Agreement between the teaching and the views of the
individual
9. Bhabbar pat = Competence of the teacher
10. Sama o no garu= Respectability and reputation of the teacher.
These ten could be broadly divided into two groups with Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and
10 as means or criteria depending on some kind of 'authority' and the remaining
four i. e
Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 depending on 'reason. '
In fact unlike some of the Sama teachers the Buddha did not totally condemn
the Vedas as foolish babb1e. Instead, in Suttas such as Tevijja of the Dighanikaya
the Buddha criticized the Vedas on different grounds, pointing out their limitations
and shortcomings, thus cautioning the people against blindly accepting them
as containing infallible, gospel truth. Similar was the attitude of the Buddha
with regard other means coming under the category of 'authority. ' In the Buddha's
view all kinds of tradition, whether it is the unbroken traditions maintained
by generation of teachers, texts or any other traditions, need be neither discarded
nor blindly clung to. The four Mahapadesas (great authorities) referred to in
the Mahaparinibbana Sutta of the Dighanikaya clearly show the importance attached
by the Buddha to such traditions. The Payasi Sutta of Dighanikaya shows the
Buddha's general attitude to all kinds of tradition. It is the slavish acceptance
of traditions that the Buddha condemned. It is seen that even hearsay was not
considered as being intrinsically useless, for even that could be made use of
after verification.
There is ample evidence in the canon to show that the Buddha did never reject
outright the use of logic and reason. He has made it quite clear, as he did
in the Sandaka Sutta of Majjhimanikaya, that both these have their own inherent
limitations and, therefore, he vividly brought out how logic and reason often
lead to endless conflicts. Suttas such as Kalahavivada, Culavyaha, Mahaviyaha,
all in the Suttaniputa, provide concrete evidence to the Buddha's attitude to
all means of knowledge Falling under 'reason. '
Yet, textual evidence shows that the Buddha did not discard the use logic and
reason as totally invalid and useless. The Upali, Apattaka and Culamalunkya
Suttas of Majjhimanikaya show how the Buddha very aptly used logic and reason,
well keeping in mind their limitations and the pitfalls into which they could
lead indiscriminate users of such means.
The four Mah show also the important place assigned to both 'Bhabbar pat and
Sama o no garu. ' Nowhere did the Buddha advocate the total rejection of the
authority of teachers. In fact, the Buddha named 'paratoghosa', that is teaching
coming from outside which includes instruction and guidance of teachers, as
one of the two factors that is essential to develop right view (samma dithi);
the other factor being proper reflection (yoniso manasik).
If this is the true position, then there is no ground whatsoever to hold that
in the Kalama Sutta the Buddha advocates the rejection of any of the ten means
(criteria) of knowledge (truth). If so, what does the Buddha advocates? From
the content of the Sutta what is clear is that the Buddha admonishes the Kalamas
not to adopt any of the above mentioned ten means of knowledge as absolute criteria
or standards or measurements in evaluating the quality of a religious teaching,
specially of teachings pertaining to ethics. The mere fact that a teaching is
found in the texts considered sacred, or taught by an honored, reputed teacher,
or is in total agreement with logic and reason and so on should not be taken
as sufficient and valid grounds to accept any teaching as true and wholesome.
Instead the Buddha presents a new criterion, which is also found often referred
to in such other Suttas such as the Bahitika, Ambalatthikarahulovada (both in
the Majjhimanikaya). This criterion is to be applied by carrying out a personal
test of the teaching by using one's understanding and experience. This is a
very simple, straight forward, and easily applicable test. The Buddha while
asking the Kalamas not to depend on any of the earlier mentioned criteria says:
'But, Kalamas, when you know for yourselves, these things are unprofitable,
these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by the
wise; these things when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sorrow
- then indeed you should reject them. ' And the Buddha adds that ' ... when
you know for yourselves that these things are profitable, blameless, praised
by the wise, when performed andundertaken conduce to profit and happiness, then
having undertaken them, abide in them.
'
Now what is the position with regard to the second conclusion? This concerns
the scope of application of this criterion. When considered broadly, there appear
to be two view-points on this. One is that, it is applicable to all matters
concerned with the Dhamma, the other is that it is applicable to Dhamma as well
as 'all other matters. ' It is necessary that one should consider the specific
context in which the Kalama Sutta was preached. The Sutta says that the Kalamas
were perplexed and confused by the claims put forward by different religious
teachers who visited their village, praising each one's teachings and denouncing
the rest as false. When the Buddha visited the village of Kesaputa, its residents,
the Kalamas, came up to him and said: 'Sir, certain recluses and Brahmins come
to Kesaputta. As to their own view they proclaim and expound it in full, but
as to the views of others, they abuse, revile, depreciate and condemn... when
we listen to them, Sir, we have doubt and wavering, as to which of these teachers
speaks the truth and which speaks falsehood. '
It is to allay this specific 'doubt and wavering' that the Buddha presented
the novel criterion, involving a personal test of the teachings concerned. From
the answer given by the Buddha it appears that he considered the question as
pertaining to an ethical issue. The Buddha's admonition to Kalamas is to find
out for themselves, whether any of these teachings leads to the growth of greed,
malice and delusion. These are the three root-causes of evil, and the avoidance
of these is the assured way to a moral life, finally leading to Nibbána.
The injunction: 'when you know for yourselves' (attan j) has necessarily to
be taken as being limited to this context. The Sutta itself does not provide
any justification to expand the ambit of its application, either to cover all
matters pertaining to the Dhamma, or in general to all matters. This second
assumption is obviously very far-fetched. There are many matters that we all
cannot understand and know for ourselves. Yet, we accept them and take them
for granted reposing 'faith' on the competence of those who pronounce views
on them. We would not be able to conduct even affairs of day to day life if
we ourselves try to understand and know all issues and problems that we have
to face. This is why we seek the help, and advice of those who are more knowledgeable,
and possessing expertise in different areas.
Even the first assumption is questionable. The Buddha made this admonition to
an ordinary set of people. Therefore, it is apparent that he did not expect
them to use a any expertise or super-knowledge in deciding on the issues concerned.
His advice was to use common sense and personal experience they have had with
regard to ordinary situations, leading them to greed, hate and delusion. The
Buddha very clearly said in the Ki**giri Sutta of the Majjhimanikaya that final
knowledge is not achievable at the beginning itself, but it is an outcome of
gradual training.
It should be remembered that the Buddha's teachings contains fundamentals, which
are not within the comprehension of the beginners, or of the untrained. There
is quite a lot of textual evidence showing even liberated senior disciples of
the Buddha approaching the Buddha for clarification regarding certain basic
issues. They clear their knowledge and obtain clear vision on such issues only
after listening to the Buddha's explanations. Question pertaining to kamma,
rebirth etc. necessarily have to be understood through forms super-knowledge,
which are above the capability of ordinary human beings. Until such knowledge
is gained we have to accept them on 'faith. '
In this context is it possible to justify the assumption that the Kalama Sutta
gives a blanket approval for all to use free inquiry to obtain knowledge regarding
all matters pertaining to the Dhamma? Neither the evidence found in the Kalama
Sutta nor evidence in other canonical texts supports such an assumption.
This does not mean that we are not allowed to inquire into these issues. We
could, but we should not hurriedly conclude that we have arrived at the truth
and, then not only cling to it, but engage in pronouncing it loud, denouncing
every other view as false. This is really what happens when one arrives at truth
through free inquiry. Then one's conclusion becomes one's 'own view' which prompts
a person to proclaim it and defend it at any cost. This, on the one hand, leads
to conflict on the other, to misrepresentation of the teaching. Results of both
are harmful.
A very strong reason why a majority wish to widen the parameters of free inquiry
is the belief that 'faith' is a feature of primitive and undeveloped religions
and that Buddhism which is a novel teaching denounces all forms of faith. This
again is a little far from the truth. It is well known that Saddhu in whichever
manner it is translated- confidence, trust, faith etc. - is an essential feature
of Buddhist practice. It is not a kind of blind faith (am lik saddhu but faith
founded on reasonable grounds, ( saddhu To develop saddhu one need not have
absolute proof, but reasonably acceptable evidence. Free inquiry comes very
much later, after saddhu The Canka Sutta of Majjhimanik clearly lays down the
proper procedure for the application of this free inquiry. This procedure starts
with saddhu which finally gives way to pañña (wisdom). In between,
there is a gradual process that leads a person, step by step, towards the truth,
which is beneficial and wholesome. There is no reason for the Buddhists to shy
away from the fact that Buddhism accepts the usefulness of saddhu as an essential,
primary element in its practice. Saddhu provides us with a good start to properly
grasp the doctrine. It certainly will be good to remember what the Alagaddapama
Sutta of Majjhimanikaya says would be the fate of those who wrongly grasp the
Dhamma. It says that just as a man who catches a snake by its coil or tail would
be stung by the snake, similarly a man whowrongly grasp the teaching would also
come to harm and suffering.
Free inquiry has become almost a fad among the Buddhists. There is a proliferation
of literature giving fascinating and novel interpretations, which are not only
far-fetched, but total misrepresentations of the Buddha's teachings. Some balanced
writers have attempted to caution these over-enthusiastic propagators of Buddhism
by presenting the true significance of the Kalama Sutta (eg. Buddhist Publication
Society, News Letter, No. 09, Spring, 1988). But unfortunately, these warnings
have gone unnoticed. Unlimited freedom of thought is being brandished as the
'trade mark' of Buddhism, thus further opening the flood-gates for more misrepresentations
to flow out.